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CHAPTER 8 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
MONROE L. INKER 
§8.1. Divorce: Decree nisi. Templer v. Templer l is the only case 
decided during the 1964 SURVEY year of significance in the area of 
domestic relations. The Supreme Judicial Court restated the effect 
of a decree nisi in a divorce action and by implication reaffirmed the 
rule that a second judge has the power to vacate or modify previous 
interlocutory action of another judge of the same court. 
A decree nisi for divorce was granted to the libellant wife on 
February 14, 1961, by probate judge A. Within six months, on 
August 14, 1961, the libellee husband filed "objections to the entry 
of a final decree," on the ground that before the decree nisi became 
absolute the libellant wife had remarried. A certified copy of the 
record of the wife's remarriage to a former husband was annexed to 
the statement of objections. The applicable statute provides: 
Decrees of divorce shall in the first instance be decrees nisi, 
and shall become absolute after the expiration of six months 
from the entry thereof, unless the court within said period, for 
sufficient cause, upon application of any party interested, other-
wise orders.2 
It must be remembered that a decree nisi does not terminate the 
marriage relationship.s 
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Probate Courts, entitled "Objections 
to Decrees Becoming Absolute," provides: 
At any time before the expiration of six months from the grant-
ing of a decree of divorce nisi, the libellee, or any other person 
MONROE L. INKER. is a member of the firm of Crane, Inker, Zamparelli, and Oteri, 
Boston, and Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert H. Minasian of the 
Board of Student Editors of the Annual Survey in the preparation of this chapter. 
§8.1. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 547, 197 N.E.2d 589. 
2 Under G.L., c. 208, §21, a decree nisi becomes absolute at ,the expiration of 
six months when no objections have been filed to such decree becoming absolute. 
In Eldridge v. Eldridge it was settled that "[i]ndependently of the rule, a decree 
for divorce may be revoked or denied if against public policy or for any reason 
inadequate in law." 278 Mass. ll09, ll12, 180 N.E. Ill7, Ill9 (19ll2). 
3 See Rollins v. Gould, 244 Mass. 270, 196 N.E. 858 (192ll), wherein it was held 
that a decree nisi does not become absolute for six monilis, and ,thus does not 
terminate the relationship of husband and wife, and upon the death of ,the husband 
during this period, the wife may share in his estate. 
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interested, may file in the Registry of Probate a statement of 
objections to the decree becoming absolute, which shall set forth 
specifically the facts on which it is founded and shall be verified 
by affidavit. . .. The decree shall not become absolute until 
such objections have been disposed of by the court. If said 
petition to stay the decree absolute is subsequently dismissed by 
the court the decree shall become absolute as of six months from 
the date of the decree nisi. 
In accordance with Rule 45, on November 28, 1961, another probate 
judge (B) endorsed upon the objections filed by the libellee husband 
"Al'd" [allowed] and signed his name as "Acting Judge of Probate." 
On April 20, 1962, the husband filed a petition to vacate the decree 
nisi, alleging the remarriage and the "allowance" of his objections, 
and prayed that he be permitted to be heard on the merits of his 
defense to the libel. The record does not state whether the husband 
had defended the merits of the libel prior to the entry of the decree 
nisi. On October 24, 1962, Judge A, who had entered the decree 
nisi, wrote upon the statement of objections "dismissed by order of 
court" and allowed the wife's motion to strike the objections and 
to enter a decree absolute. The husband appealed. 
Because of the confusing circumstances involved, the Supreme 
Judicial Court asked each of the probate judges to submit a report 
of the material facts found by him. Judge B, in his report, found 
that the wife had in fact remarried her former husband, and he ruled 
that "the marriage was illegal and void in that she was still married in 
this Commonwealth, and further that she was not entitled to have 
a decree of divorce made absolute." Judge A, in his report, found 
that there had been a hearing at which counsel for the wife stated 
that he had requested the hearing because this judge had granted the 
decree nisi and "had handled the case from the outset." At that time 
Judge A had in his possession certain letters from the wife in Michigan 
in which she stated that "she did not know that her divorce was not 
fully effective when she was remarried." On these facts, it was Judge 
A's judgment that the decree should become absolute.' The report 
stated that in making the decision he had overlooked the notation 
made by Judge B on the statement of objections. "This was not done 
deliberately or intentionally, but was an oversight ... " . 
On these highly confused facts, it appeared that Judge A undertook 
to decide the case upon the mistaken assumption that it had not been 
previously decided by another judge. The Supreme Judicial Court 
4 See Boltz v. Boltz, S25 Mass. 726, 92 N.E.2d S65 (1950), in which the wife's 
divorce from her first husband was not absolute; the COUl't held that she was still 
his wife until the divorce became absolute, and marriage to a second husband 
prior to the entry of the decree absolute was invalid; remarriage in good faith 
still voids the second marriage. In Moors v. Moors, 121 Mass. 232, 2SS (1876). the 
Court stated: "It hardly need be added, that this second marriage furnishes suf-
ficient cause why the conditional divorce should not be made absolute." 
2
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stated: "There was no intention to re-examine the ruling of the first 
judge. . .. The rulings made by the second judge on October 24, 
1962, must be set aside as inadvertent and wholly unintentional."l1 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in its decision, restated the effect of 
a decree nisi. The Court, however, in determining that Judge A had 
inadvertently ordered the decree absolute, did not find it necessary 
to decide the issue of whether Judge A could have vacated the ruling 
of Judge B had he so intended.6 
It is settled rule in Massachusetts that the judges of Probate Court 
have equal powers and that one judge may overrule the findings of 
a fellow judge, provided the findings of the first judge are not the 
result of a trial on the merits.7 In view of this rule, Judge A, after 
a hearing on the merits of the husband's defense to the libel, could 
have properly overruled Judge B's allowance of the libellee husband's 
statement of objections.s Since the decree nisi is an interlocutory 
decree, the libel is still pending and, in accordance with Rule 45 of 
the Rules of the Probate Courts, the libellee husband was entitled 
as a matter of right to a hearing on the question of whether the decree 
nisi should become absolute. The wife's remarriage furnishes suffi-
cient cause why the conditional divorce should not be made absolute, 
and Judge A would have committed reversible error if, after a hearing 
on the merits of the husband's defense to the libel, he had overruled 
Judge B's allowance of the libellee husband's objections and entered 
a decree absolute.9 A marriage entered into within six months of a 
decree nisi is void.10 
The Massachusetts rule, which is in line with the majority view, 
allows the judge to set aside an interlocutory order whether it be his 
own or that of another judge.11 If a court should make a mistake 
II Templer v. Templer, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 547, 550, 197 N.E.2d 589, 591. 
6 The Court made little mention of the fact that an annulment had been decreed 
in Michigan on January 12, 1962, between libellant and her third (former) husband. 
The Court stated that such evidence was not part of the record in the case, and 
even though the Michigan court had ruled the marriage invalid, this would not 
alter the fact that an illegal marriage had been entered into. 
7 See Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 29 N.E.2d 140 (1940). 
8 See Lye v. Lye, 322 Mass. 155, 76 N.E.2d 180 (1948), wherein the Court, upon 
hearing of objections to a divorce decree becoming absolute, allowed the intro-
duction of evidence bearing upon the merits of the libel for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the libellee had a meritorious or substantial defense. 
9 Moors v. Moors, 121 Mass. 232 (1876). 
10 See Fraser v. Fraser, 334 Mass. 4, 133 N.E.2d 236 (1956). See also Moors v. 
Moors, note 9 supra. 
11 In some jurisdictions, particularly in New York and the Second Circuit of 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, it has been declared that a judge lacks the power 
to vacate or modify an interlocutory order of another judge. See Annotation, 132 
A.L.R. 1 (1941). In an excellent article, The "Law of the Case" in Massachusetts, 
9 B.U.L. Rev. 225, 234 (1929), Justice Lummus, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court in Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597,29 N.E.2d 140 (1940), stated: 
"Any rule denying the right of a judge to reverse or vacate the earlier decree 
of another judge in the same case would in practice run counter to the elementary 
principle that any action of the court short of final judgment or decree remains 
3
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of law, it must have the right to correct it. This is often done in the 
progress of a jury trial, and there is no reason why the same principle 
should not apply in equity or probate. Otherwise there would be 
the useless formality of requiring parties to go to an appellate court 
to correct the mistake which the lower court knows it has committed. 
If the correction may not be made by a second judge, any further 
action in the case would entail a serious waste of time and expense 
both to the litigants and to the public. 
In summary, the case of Templer v. Templer12 actually only re-
states the interlocutory effect of a decree nisi. General practitioners, 
however, should be aware that in all actions a second judge may 
modify or vacate an interlocutory ruling made by another judge of 
the same court at any time before the interlocutory ruling becomes 
final. 
§8.2. Divorce: Residence requirements. In the law of divorce, 
domicile and jurisdiction are siamese twins that can never be sepa-
rated.1 The residence (domicile) requirement that must be satisfied 
in order to give the court jurisdiction to hear a libel for divorce was 
amended during the 1964 SURVEY year.2 Under the prior law, the 
courts of this Commonwealth had no jurisdiction to grant a divorce 
if the parties had never lived together as husband and wife in Massachu-
setts, unless the libellant had lived here for the last five years preceding 
the filing of the libel, or the parties were inhabitants of the Common-
wealth when married and the libellant had lived in the state for 
three years.3 Furthermore, a divorce could be granted for any cause 
allowed by law, no matter where it had occurred, unless it appeared 
that the libellant had moved into this Commonwealth for the pur-
pose of obtaining a divorce.4 Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1964 
amended General Laws, Chapter 208, by striking out the former 
Section 5 and inserting in its place the following section: 
If the libellant has lived in this commonwealth for five years 
last preceding the filing of the libel, or if both parties were in-
habitants of this commonwealth at the time of their marriage 
and the libellant has lived in this commonwealth for three years 
last preceding such filing, if the cause occurred without the 
commonwealth, or if the libellant is a resident of the common-
wealth at the time of the filing of the libel and the cause oc-
curred within the commonwealth, a divorce may be decreed for 
within the control of the court and is open to revision until final judgment or 
decree .... All the judges have equal power .... To create a rule of law which 
would restrict the exercise of any of those powers to anyone judge. is to impair 
the efficiency of the court." 
121964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 547. 197 N.E.2d 589. 
§8.2. 1 See Bernard v. Bernard. 331 Mass. 455, 120 N.E.2d 187 (1954). 
2 G.L., c. 208, §§4, 5. 
3 See Hayes v. Hayes, 256 Mass. 97, 98, 152 N.E. 91, 92 (1926). 
4 G.L., c. 208, 5. 
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any cause allowed by law, unless it appears that the libellant has 
removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining 
a divorce.1S 
This italicized clause, if it means what its terms purport, eliminates 
the three-year residence requirement in the case in which the libellant 
is a resident of the Commonwealth at the time of the filing of the 
libel and the cause of divorce occurred within the Commonwealth. 
The word "resident" as used in the statute is obviously synonymous 
with domiciliary. It would appear that this is all the amendment 
does.S The legislative draftsman could have written the statute so 
that its meaning was not clothed in confusing terms. 
The present restriction, that when the libellant comes into the 
state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce the court will not hear 
the libel, continues in -effect. This legislation restates our legislature's 
policy of discouraging migratory divorces. The Commonwealth pro-
vides access to its Probate Courts for the benefit of its own citizens 
and not to dissolve marriages existing between citizens of other states, 
merely because one of them has had a domicile in Massachusetts at 
some time. The three-year residence requirement is still enforced 
if both parties were inhabitants of the Commonwealth at the time 
of their marriage and the cause occurred without the Commonwealth. 
If they have never lived together in this Commonwealth as husband 
and wife, the court only has jurisdiction if the libellant has lived 
in this Commonwealth for five years. 
§8.3. Adoption: Waiver of consent. One of the most troublesome 
areas in the law of adoption in recent years has been the problem 
of consent of certain parties to adoption proceedings.1 During the 
1964 SURVEY year an important change in the adoption law was made 
by Acts of 1964, Chapter 424, amending General Laws, Chapter 210, 
Section 3A. 
Section 2 of General Laws, Chapter 210, requires that the 
written consent of the lawful parents, or of the mother, or of the 
parental substitute be obtained before a decree for adoption will 
be entered. Section S sets forth certain exceptions when the consent 
of these parties is not required.2 The prior provisions of Section SA 
IS Emphasis supplied. 
8 G.L., c. 208, §6B, is not affected by :this amendment, and a party filing a libel 
for divorce must still certify that the parties have been living apart for a period 
of not less than three months. 
§8.5. 1 For a brief analysis of the early legislative amendments to G.L., c. 210, 
§§2 and 5, see Wasserman, Assent to Adoption, 57 Mass. L.Q. 56 (Aug. 1952). 
2 G.L., c. 210, §5, states in part: " .•. if such person is adjudged ... hopelessly 
insane, or is imprisoned ... under sentence for a term of which more than three 
years remain unexpired at the date of the petition: or if he has wilfully deserted 
or neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for such child for one year 
last preceding the date of the petition • • . : or if he has suffered such child to 
be supported for more than one year continuously prior to the petition by an 
incorporated charitable inatitudon ... : or if he has been sentenced to imprison. 
5
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allowed the Department of Public Welfare to commence a proceed-
ing in Probate Court to establish whether the consent of any person 
named in Sections 2 and 3 would be required to a subsequent petition 
for adoption of a child in the care or custody of the department. The 
section did not establish any express standards to be followed in 
determining whether consent was necessary. The uncertainty regard-
ing guideposts was laid to rest by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Consent to Adoption of a Minor.s The Court in that case stated: 
Section 3A neither states nor implies any grounds other than 
those specified in §3 for finding that "consent is not required." 
The reference to "the consent of any person named in the pre-
vious two sections" indicates the intention to look thereto for 
the standards for the determination under §3A. Section 3A 
contains no words appropriate to vest in the probate judge dis-
cretion to modify or supplement the express requirements of 
§§2 and 3.4 
To circumvent the type of result reached in that case, Section 3A 
was amended.1I By the terms of the new provision, in a proceeding 
brought by the Department of Public Welfare to determine if consent 
is required: 
Such consent shall not be required if the court finds that the 
best interests of the child will be served by placement for adop-
tion, and the court shall not in making its determination be 
limited by the conditions set forth in sections two and three or 
by any provision of the law, but shall give due regard to the 
ability, capacity and fitness of the child's parents or guardian and 
to the plans proposed by the department or other agency initia-
ting such petition. 
The most casual reading of the new amendment evokes the ob-
servation that the probate judges are given broad power in adoption 
proceedings. This amendment illustrates quite aptly a shift in em-
ment for drunkenness upon a third conviction within one year and neglects to 
provide proper care and maintenance for such child; or if such person has been 
convicted of being a common night walker or a lewd, wanton and lascivious 
person, and neglects to provide proper care and maintenance for such child." 
S !l45 Mass. 706, 189 N.E.2d 505 (196!l). This was the first opportunity for the 
Court to construe the procedural aspects of Section !lAo For a discussion of this 
case see 1OO!l Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.1. 
4 !l45 Mass. 706, 707-708, 189 N.E.2d 505, 506 (196!l). In this case the findings 
showed ,the nonsupport of the child by the respondent (father) for eight months 
prior to the date of the decree but made no finding as to nonsupport for a year 
prior to >the filing of the petition. These facts tended ,to support the conclusion of 
unfitness to have custody but did not show misconduct of the respondent (father) 
sufficient by Section !l standards to make inapplicable the required consent imposed 
by Seotion 2. As a result, the decree determining that the consent of the father 
was not required on subsequent petition for adoption was reversed. 
II Acts of 1964, c. 425. 
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phasis from the best interests of the parent to those of the child. In 
Richards v. Forest, the Court said: " ... the first and paramount duty 
of the court is to consult the welfare of the child. To that governing 
principle, every other public and private consideration must yield."6 
It would appear that the protective provisions of Section 2, re-
quiring the consent of certain parties, and the exceptions contained 
in Section 3 have been diluted further with the amendment of Section 
3A. The efforts of the legislature in enacting the many amendments 
to the adoption consent provisions indicate that it recognizes that 
adoptions should be permitted when they are for the best interests 
of the child, and that any obstacle impeding such an adoption should 
be removed. 
§8.4. Proposed legislation: Husband and wife tort actions. Chap-
ter 18 of the Resolves of 1964 provides for an investigation by the 
Judicial Council concerning the enactment of a law authorizing 
husbands and wives to sue each other in actions of tort. At present 
in Massachusetts and a majority of jurisdictions there exists a general 
disability barring tort actions between husbands and wives. This in-
ability to sue is based upon the common law doctrine of a legal 
identity of the two. The wife's legal existence during coverture was 
deemed to be incorporated in that of the husband. At common law 
an injured spouse received some limited protection from the criminal 
law, which refused to stand on the identity of the persons except as 
to crimes involving the right to possession of property. Some inten-
tional torts committed between husband and wife were recognized 
as grounds for separation or divorce, and equity protected the wife 
against the tortious conduct of the husband in any separate trust 
estate she might have.1 This fiction of marital unity has been dis-
appearing, and the change in attitude is owed in large part to the 
enactment of Married Women's Property Acts.2 As a result of these 
acts, the wife has been able to deal with third persons as if she were 
a single woman.a The courts have generally agreed that they will 
permit a wife to maintain an action against her husband for any tort 
against her property interest. Thus she may recover from him for 
fraud.4 The Massachusetts legislature in 1963, consistent with this 
change in attitude, enacted a statute authorizing a husband and wife 
to contract and to sue each other upon any such contract.1i 
In a minority of jurisdictions the disability to sue in tort has been 
6278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932). 
§8.4. 1 See Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935). , 
2 Ibid. In this case it was pointed out that although a married woman in this 
jurisdiction has been freed from nearly all of the legal conditions arising from the 
doctrine of common law unity of husband and wife, contracts and actions at law 
between husband and wife are prohibited. 
8 Hepburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271 (1873). 
4 Moreau v. Moreau, 250 Mass. 110, 145 N.E. 43 (1924). 
Ii G.L., c. 209, §§2, 6, as amended by Acts of 1963, c. 765, §§l, 2. 
7
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removed.6 Courts adhering to this disability have reasoned that its 
retention is necessary to preserve the domestic peace,7 or that its 
abolition would encourage litigation which (in the case of a suit 
against a spouse with insurance coverage) might be collusive.8 New 
York, in order to prevent collusive suits, enacted a law permitting 
husband and wife to sue each other in tort9 but at the same time 
amended the insurance law to provide: 
No policy shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an 
insured because . . . of in juries to his or her spouse . . . or his 
or her property . . . unless express provision relating thereto is 
specifically included in the policy.10 
Increased rates for the coverage referred to in the statute seem to be 
the only actual deterrent to collusion established by the statute. 
All arguments in favor of continuing the disability seem specious. 
The judicial council should adopt the reasoning set forth in Bogen 
v. Bogen, where the court stated: 
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, 
put out her eye, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no 
longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he vowed 
at the altar to "love, cherish and protect" her. We have pro-
gressed that far in civilization and justice.ll 
§8.5. Injury to, or abuse of children: Report by physician. Acts 
of 1964, Chapter 534, amends General Laws, Chapter 119, by adding 
Sections 39A and 39B. Section 39A requires every licensed physician, 
intern, or medical officer who professionally examines a child under 
sixteen years of age and has reasonable cause to believe that the child 
is suffering from physical injury or abuse inflicted by a parent or 
other person responsible for its care to report the injury or abuse 
to the Department of Public Welfare. The impetus for this act 
was an awareness by local welfare authorities and police departments 
that many cases of child abuse and injury, short of serious injury, go 
unreported. Notice of these abuses will enable the proper authorities 
to take the necessary preventive measures. This is consistent with 
6 See Annotation, 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). The list now includes Alabama, Alaska, 
Ariwna, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
7 Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858). 
8 LUbowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935). Contra: Kalamian v. 
Kalamian, 107 Conn. 86, 88, 139 At!. 635, 637 (1927), where the court said: "The 
fact that the plaintiff is the wife of the defendant does not render this action 
constructively fraudulent or otherwise illegitimate. Such community of interests, 
if any, as may be inferable as existing between the defendant and the plaintiff, 
by reason of their relation as husband and wife, was a consideration affecting their 
credibility only." 
9 N. Y. Domestic ReI. Law §57. 
10 N. Y. Insurance Law §167(3). 
11219 N.C. 51, 53, 12 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1941). See also Courtney v. Courtney, 184 
Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938). 
8
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the policy of Chapter 189, which was enacted to protect children 
from harmful effects resulting from the inadequate or destructive 
behavior of parents or anyone else responsible for their care.1 
Any information contained in this report of injury, if given in 
good faith by the physician, will not constitute libel or slander.2 It 
is reasonable to assume that doctors and medical officers would hesitate 
to comply with the statute if they could be subjected to libel and 
slander suits, meritorious or not, and the attendant adverse publicity. 
This qualified privilege, conditional upon the exercise of good faith, 
relieves the doctor from any personal risk involved in complying 
with the statute. While good faith is not defined, it is obvious that 
it does not include conduct that is willful or malicious.3 Massachu-
setts has other similar medical legislation.4 
Section 39B requires the Welfare Department, upon receiving the 
information, to investigate the cause of the injury. If the parent or 
other person charged with the care of the child did inflict the injury 
and can not or will not make suitable provision for the care of the 
child, the agency is given authority to prevent any further injury to, 
or abuse of the child. Presumably this means a stern warning to the 
parent, or a court order. If the injury or abuse is serious, the agency 
has to report its findings to the district attorney of the county in 
which the injury occurred. 
The need for protecting young children against abuse is obvious, 
and this legislation is certainly needed. The legislature can only be 
criticized for not going far enough. Why the arbitrary age cut:off 
point of sixteen years? Is the physician to look the other way if 
the child is sixteen years and one month? The legislature, in enact-
ing this statute, must have realized that a child under sixteen would 
not ordinarily complain of such abuse to the Welfare Department or 
the police. It would seem that the necessity of a physician's report 
when the child is over sixteen years is just as great as it is when the 
child is five, ten, or fifteen years and eleven months, as he too may 
not complain and is still otherwise subject to his parents or guardian. 
Since the proper authorities as a general rule have no access to the 
home to investigate possible child abuse, this statute, although un-
fortunately limited by the sixteen-year cut-off, sensibly provides for 
obtaining information that would not be otherwise available. 
§8.6. Forgery of birth, marriage, or death records. Chapter 310 
of the Acts of 1964 amended Chapter 46 of the General Laws by 
adding Section 30. It provides a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment 
§8.5. 1 G.L., c. 119, §l. 
2Id. §S9A. 
8 In an action of libel or slander against a reporting physician, good faith would 
be a question of fact for the jury. 
4 See G.L., c. 112, §12. Disclosure by a doctor of information relative to venereal 
disease, if given in good faith, does not constitute libel or slander. See also id. 
§12A, requiring doctors to report to the police all cases of ,treatment for gunshot 
or knife wounds, so ,that proper investigation may be effected. 
9
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of up to six months for any person who makes, alters, or forges, or 
counterfeits, or assists another to falsely make, alter, forge, or counter-
feit a copy of a record of birth, marriage, or death, or whoever forges 
or without authority uses the signature, facsimile of the signature, 
or validating signature stamp of a city clerk upon the genuine or 
falsely made copy of such a record, or whoever uses or attempts to 
use with intent to defraud or deceive a copy of a record of birth or 
marriage of a person other than himself. One of the obvious reasons 
for enacting this provision is to deter youths under twenty-one years 
of age from procuring liquor by means of false or altered identifica-
tion. 
10
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